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Abstract
We study to what extent rms spread out their debt maturity dates across time, which we call
\granularity of corporate debt." We consider the role of debt granularity using a simple model
in which a rm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes ineciencies, such as costly asset sales
or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, rms
may diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data
on corporate bond issuers for the 1991{2011 period and establish a number of novel ndings.
First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that many rms have either very concen-
trated or highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, our model's predictions are consistent
with observed variation in granularity. Corporate debt maturities are more dispersed for larger
and more mature rms, for rms with better investment opportunities, with higher leverage ra-
tios, and with lower levels of current cash 
ows. We also show that during the recent nancial cri-
sis especially rms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more dispersed maturity
structures. Finally, granularity plays an important role for bond issuances, because we document
that newly issued corporate bond maturities complement pre-existing bond maturity proles.
JEL Classication Numbers: G13, G31, G32, G33.
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1 Introduction
It is not yet well understood to what extent rms manage the rollover dates of their bonds by
spreading out maturities. Fixed cost components of bond issues and secondary market liquidity con-
siderations should motivate rms to concentrate their debt in a single or few issues. However, even
non-nancial rms frequently have multiple bond issues outstanding, with dierent times to matu-
rity. This suggests a potentially important but heretofore unrecognized dimension of debt structure
requiring rms to trade o dierent frictions to determine an optimal debt maturity concentration.
Surprisingly, we lack both testable theoretical implications and empirical evidence. Even basic
stylized facts are largely unavailable, so there is little guidance as to what one would expect to nd.
In practice, however, debt maturity decisions are aected by the incentive to mitigate rollover risk,
which is the most common motive in Servaes and Tufano's (2006) survey of chief nancial ocers.
Our paper therefore provides a rst step towards understanding rms' decisions to spread out bond
maturity dates across time, which we call \granularity of corporate debt."
To gain an understanding of what drives this dimension of debt structure and to generate
a number of testable implications, we consider a simple, three-period model in which rollover
risk has real eects and therefore in
uences debt maturity structure. The rm has an investment
opportunity with decreasing returns to scale and payos at time three. The rm nances the project
by issuing bonds with maturities less than or equal to two. Thus, frictions, such as moral hazard or
investor preferences, prevent the rm from issuing very long-term bonds that expire at time three,
so that the rm must roll over the bonds issued at time zero at least once. In particular, we consider
two maturity structures, a concentrated and a dispersed one. The rm with a concentrated maturity
structure (or rm C) renances its bonds at one point in time (i.e. date one or two), whereas the
rm with a dispersed maturity structure (or rm D) renances its bonds at two points in time.
Along some paths, the bonds can be rolled over and the nal cash 
ows are eventually realized
in full. Along other paths, however, the rm can temporarily lose its access to the bond market.
The rm's inability to renance its bonds may arise because markets freeze for exogenous reasons or
it may arise endogenously since the rm can become temporarily exposed to a large risk.1 We show
1See, e.g., Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011) for market freezes after a decline in collateral value. There are
many reasons for a state of increased uncertainty to adversely aect a rm's ability to access capital markets that
can lead to a market freeze for that rm: negative supply shocks due to rm-specic or market-wide tightening of
credit, large legal battles or liability risks (e.g., in the oil industry as documented by Cutler and Summers (1988)
or in the pharmaceutical industry), recall risks of car manufacturers (e.g., Toyota's malfunctioning gas pedal),
challenges or disputes of patents, regulatory risks of energy companies (e.g., whether or not to exit nuclear power
1that, in such states, investors may not be able to roll over their bonds. As a result, the rm must
pass up or partially liquidate investment projects to repay the bondholders, and this is inecient.
Firm D only needs to liquidate a small fraction of its assets to repay its bonds. It has the real
option to keep the more protable assets and liquidate those with a small or zero net present value
(NPV). By contrast, if rm C cannot roll over its bonds, then it must liquidate a large fraction of
its assets (including some with higher NPVs) or forgo positive NPV projects. Thus, in our model
it is less costly to be exposed to small rollover risks at two points in time rather than being exposed
to large rollover risk at one point in time.2 On the other hand, one larger bond issue has lower

otation costs (see Lee et al. (1996)) and liquidity costs (see Longsta, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
and Mahanti et al. (2008)) than two smaller bond issues. Thus, there is a trade-o in that rm D
faces lower expected costs due to rollover risk than rm C, whereas rm C has a transaction cost
advantage over rm D.
Based on the tension between costly asset sales or underinvestment on the one hand and trans-
action costs on the other hand, we derive a number of testable implications. Our model implies
that the benets of dispersed corporate debt maturities increase with rollover risk and with the
value of investment opportunities. Moreover, corporate debt should be more dispersed for larger
and more mature rms due to their lower transaction costs, for rms with higher leverage ratios,
and for rms with lower levels of current cash 
ows due to their lower ability to withstand episodes
of limited access to external funding without costly investment reductions or project liquidations.
We construct a large panel data set that contains information on maturity structures and rm
characteristics by merging data on corporate bond issues from Mergent's Fixed Investment Secu-
rities Database (FISD) with the COMPUSTAT database. For the 1991{2011 period, we obtain an
unbalanced panel with 17,396 (9,880) rm-year observations for rms with at least one bond (two
bonds) outstanding. We use these rm-level data from FISD to measure how dispersed maturity
structures are.3 For each rm, we group bond maturities into the nearest integer years and compute
production after disasters such as Fukushima) or hedge funds (e.g., after the nancial crisis), and impending natural
catastrophes, such as oil spills whose exact consequences for businesses such as tourism are unknown for some time
(see, e.g., Massa and Zhang (2011)). One such example of a market freeze and rollover risk is the case of General
Growth Properties in April 2009.
2There may be additional motives why rms issue debt with dierent maturity dates. Matching maturities of rms'
liabilities with those of their assets requires that asset maturities can be determined easily. In addition, rms usually
consist of a large number of projects, so it is not feasible to issue a separate bond for each project. Also, asymmetric
information problems are likely to be more severe at longer horizons compared to shorter horizons, which further
limits rms' ability to match the maturities of liabilities with those of assets. Thus, the frictions that we consider in
this paper remain relevant even in the presence of other motives for spreading debt maturity dates across time.
3In robustness tests, we also include information on the maturity structure of private debt from COMPUSTAT.
2the fractions of bond amounts outstanding each year. The rst measure of maturity dispersion is
the inverse of the maturity prole's Herndahl index based on these fractions. The second measure
is related to the distance of a rm's actual maturity prole from the perfectly dispersed maturity
prole, holding its average maturity constant.
We document that there is substantial variation in debt granularity. Although a large number
of rms have highly dispersed maturity structures, we nd at the same time that many rms have
very concentrated maturity structures. These concentrated rms are typically young and small and
nance a signicant portion of their assets through a single, small bond issue, which suggests that
spreading out maturities using smaller bonds might be too costly for them. We also nd that rms
issue bonds to become more granular during economic downturns when rollover risk is supposedly
high, which supports the view that rms consider trade-os in determining maturity structure.
In addition to these basic stylized facts, we report novel results that are directly related to our
model's predictions. We nd that larger and more mature rms, rms with more valuable invest-
ment projects, and rms with more leverage exhibit more dispersed maturity proles. In contrast,
granularity is negatively associated with protability. Most of these rm characteristics remain eco-
nomically and statistically signicant after controlling for industry or rm and year xed eects,
suggesting that rms condition on these variables in the management of their debt maturity prole.
These ndings are robust to inclusion of private debt maturity proles into our granularity measures
and are also present in subsamples of rms with a high and a low proportion of private debt.4
We study several, related aspects. We check whether rms use tools other than debt granularity
to manage rollover risk. We document that rms tend to rely on credit lines to avoid high rollover
risk arising from concentrated debt structures, which is consistent with Chang, Chen, and Das-
gupta (2010). Moreover, during the 2008{2009 nancial crisis when rollover risk is likely to have
been higher, we nd that especially rms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more
dispersed debt maturity structures. In addition, we establish that the dispersion of debt maturi-
ties moves over time towards target levels. In particular, speed-of-adjustment regressions reveal
surprisingly high adjustment rates, ranging from 21% to 56% per year.
We also provide evidence of active management of debt maturity dispersion by examining
4Renegotiation is common for private debt, so realized maturity is much shorter than contracted maturity (see,
e.g., Roberts and Su (2009)). Private debt's maturity is also easy to modify (see, e.g., Mian and Santos (2011)).
Firms with a large proportion of private debt may therefore not need dispersed public debt rollover dates and yet
we do not nd evidence for such a substitution eect.
3whether rms consider pre-existing maturity proles when they issue new bonds. To do so, we
investigate whether discrepancies between a rm's pre-existing maturity prole and a benchmark
maturity prole (based on rm characteristics implied by our model) explain future debt issue be-
havior. We nd that, if a rm has a large fraction of bonds outstanding in any given maturity bucket
relative to its benchmark prole, then it is signicantly less likely to issue bonds in those maturity
buckets. For example, the probability of issuing additional nine- or ten-year maturity bonds drops
by 0.18 of a percentage point for every percentage point that a rm's maturity prole exceeds the
benchmark prole in this bucket. The results hold across all maturity buckets, are largely invariant
to the denition of the benchmarks or buckets, and are also economically signicant.
Our paper is related to several models of debt maturity and rollover frictions.5 By linking cor-
porate bond credit risk and bond market liquidity risk, He and Xiong (2012) show that short-term
debt exacerbates rollover risk. He and Milbradt (2012) endogenize the feedback between secondary
market liquidity risk and rollover risk { reduced liquidity raises equity's rollover losses, leading to
earlier endogenous default, which in turn worsens bond liquidity. Chen, Yu, and Yang. (2012) study
the link between credit spreads, systematic risk, and lumpy maturity structure. These papers focus
on single-bond rms' debt maturity choice. Auh and Sundaresan (2013) analyze the optimal liabil-
ity structure of rms when there is the possibility of a run by short-term lenders. They show that,
when the bankruptcy code allows for violations of absolute priority, the optimal liability structure
may include both long-term debt and secured short-term debt, with safe harbor protection. More
closely related to ours is a recent paper by Diamond and He (2012), which shows that maturing
short-term debt can lead to more debt overhang than non-maturing long-term debt. However, none
of these papers examine the decision of diversifying debt rollovers across dates to avoid maturity
concentrations. In our setting, we show that neither the issuance of a single long-term nor that of a
single short-term debt claim is optimal, because only a combination of debt with dierent rollover
dates can reduce ineciencies due to rollover risk.
Our paper is also related to recent empirical and survey research. Based on a global survey,
Servaes and Tufano (2006) report that chief nancial ocers are concerned about losing access to
debt markets and, in particular, that debt maturity choice is strongly driven by the objective of
managing rollover risk by avoiding maturity concentrations. Almeida et al. (2012) document that
rms with a greater fraction of long-term debt maturing at the onset of the 2007 nancial crisis
5For earlier theories of maturity structure, see, e.g., Diamond (1991, 1993) and Flannery (1986, 1994).
4had a more pronounced investment decline than otherwise similar rms.6 In the context of U.S.
Treasury bonds, Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) argue that rms vary their debt maturity
to act as macro liquidity providers by absorbing supply shocks due to changes in the maturity
of Treasuries. Using syndicated loan data for U.S. rms, Mian and Santos (2011) nd that most
credit worthy rms frequently manage (i.e. extend) loan maturities to reduce liquidity risk. Rauh
and Su (2010) and Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2012) establish that { relative to large, high credit
quality rms { small, low rated rms have dispersed or multi-tiered debt structures, while small,
unrated rms specialize in fewer types. Finally, Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell. (2012), who docu-
ment declining debt maturities for U.S. rms, nd that rms with more renancing risk increase
their cash holdings and save more cash from their cash 
ows.7 Unlike these studies, we focus on
understanding the dispersion of corporate debt maturities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its implications.
Section 3 presents data sources, summary statistics, and stylized facts. Section 4 provides the empir-
ical analysis of granularity and Section 5 reports the results for bond issuance. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Debt Granularity
In the presence of frictions due to rollover risk rms should respond by adjusting the distribution of
debt maturity dates. To formalize this intuition and to better understand its implications for debt
granularity, we study a three-period model of an initially all-equity nanced rm. The rm has as-
sets in place (or initial net worth), A, and a project that requires a capital outlay, I, at time t0. In the
absence of early project liquidations, the project generates a cash 
ow I+H at time t3. We normal-
ize the riskless interest rate to zero and assume that the NPV of the project, H, is greater than I=2.
The rm issues straight one- or two-period bonds to raise the required capital of I  A. To keep
the analysis focused, we do not consider three-period bonds or equity. In a more general model,
short maturity debt is optimal due to informational asymmetries (see, e.g., Diamond (1991), Dia-
mond and He (2012), or Milbradt and Oehmke (2012)), and equity is also dominated as long as debt
tax shields are suciently valuable. Thus, the project is nanced by bond issues at time t0 that
must be rolled over before time t3. However, at times t1 and t2, the bond market may freeze with
probability . Appendix A provides an extended model where market freezes arise endogenously,
6Similarly, Hu (2010) nds rms with more maturing long-term debt had larger increases in credit spreads.
7See Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Johnson (2003) for empirical debt maturity studies.
5generating the same implications for debt granularity.
If the rm is unable to renance maturing bonds due to a market freeze, then assets from
the project must be sold to generate the funds required to repay the bondholders (an alternative
interpretation of this ineciency is that the rm needs to cut back on investment). Such a partial
liquidation reduces the nal cash 
ow and generates an immediate cash 
ow. We consider two
discrete levels of asset sales. A moderate asset sale generates liquidation proceeds of I=2 and
reduces nal cash 
ows by the same amount. Thus, at t1 and t2 cash 
ows of up to I=2 are costlessly
transferable from time t3 via an asset sale. By contrast, a large asset sale generates liquidation
proceeds of I but reduces the nal cash 
ows by I=2 + H. Thus, a large asset sale is inecient,
since H > I=2. This is either because of illiquidity of the collateral assets to be sold or because
of decreasing economies of scale, i.e. the rst project units to be liquidated have zero NPV but as
more units of the project must be liquidated, positive NPV is lost. We assume that any excess cash
generated by the asset sale not needed to repay the maturing bonds is paid out to stockholders.8
Figure 1. Evolution of Debt Rollover
Figure 3. Evolution of Roll-Over Decisions
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This ﬁgure plots the time line of rollover decisions for the dispersed maturity structure (or Firm D) with
two smaller issues, which expire at time t
−
1 and t
−
2 , and the concentrated maturity structure (or Firm C)
with one larger issue, which expires at time t
−
2 . An expiring issue needs to be rolled over to time t3 to
obtain the ﬁrm’s continuation value.
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This gure plots the time line of debt rollover for the dispersed maturity structure (or Firm D) with two smaller
issues, which expire at time t1 and t2, and for the concentrated maturity structure (or Firm C) with one larger
issue, which expires at time t2. An expiring bond issue needs to be rolled over to time t3 or repaid with internally
generated cash to realize the project's cash 
ow.
We consider two initial maturity distributions, a concentrated and a dispersed one (see Figure 1).
We refer to the former as rm C and to the latter as rm D. Firm C issues bonds at time t0 with ma-
turities at either time t1 or time t2, at which point they are rolled over to time t3 whenever possible.
Since it is straightforward to show that rm C is indierent between an initial maturity of time t1 or
time t2, we only consider the concentrated maturity structure at time t2. In contrast, rm D issues
8Thus, we assume that it is expensive to carry forward excess corporate cash balances from time t1 to t2. This is
the case if free cash balances can be (partially) expropriated by management or used for empire building purposes.
6two bonds at time t0, one with maturity t1 and one with maturity t2. Thus, rm D has a dispersed
maturity structure. We assume that the bonds issued initially by rm D have equal face value.
In practice, bond issuances have a xed cost component. To capture scale economies of larger
issues, we assume that the rm pays a xed cost per issue, k, at time t0. As a result, rm C has a
transaction cost advantage, because it incurs issue costs of k, whereas rm D incurs issue costs of
2k. In addition, k can be thought to re
ect the fact that a single large bond issue may have a more
liquid secondary market, thus leading to a lower illiquidity discount than two smaller bond issues.
For evidence on a positive relation between issue size and direct issuance costs and secondary mar-
ket liquidity, respectively, see Lee et al. (1996) and Longsta, Mithal, and Neis (2005) or Mahanti
et al. (2008). Moreover, Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) provide evidence that bond spreads decline
monotonically with issue size, which is consistent with an ecnomies of scale interpretation. Finally,
note that issue costs at each point in time would also favor rm C because it has only two issuances,
while rm D has four issuances (see Figure 1).
Notice that bonds are risk-free and hence the face value of the concentrated rm's bonds equals
BC = I   A. Therefore, if BC > I=2, the concentrated rm faces costly rollover risk. If the bond
market freezes at time t2, then the rm must engage in a large asset sale, which reduces nal cash

ows by I=2+H to generate liquidation proceeds at time t2 of I. On the other hand, the two bonds
of the dispersed rm have a face value of BD
1 = BD
2 = (I   A)=2, which is less than I=2. In case
of a market freeze, rm D only needs to engage in a moderate asset sale, which reduces nal cash

ows by I=2 to generate liquidation proceeds at time t1 and/or at time t2 of I=2. Therefore, the
dispersed rm does not face costly rollover risk. More generally, of course, both types of rms may
nd it costly to renance their bonds and hence our framework corresponds to a relative statement
in that a concentrated maturity structure will lead to larger ineciencies than a dispersed one.
As rm D encounters no ineciencies, it is easy to verify that rm D's equity value is given by:
ED = I + H   (I   A)   2k : (1)
Firm C does not face a rollover problem with probability 1    and repays the bonds at time t3.
However, if BC > I=2, a large asset sale is required with probability  to generate a time t2 cash

ow of I by reducing time t3 cash 
ow by I=2+H. The resulting ineciency is given by H  I=2.
Alternatively, if assets in place, A, are suciently high such that BC  I=2, then even the rm
with a concentrated maturity structure does not face costly rollover risk. Therefore, the value of
7rm C's equity value is given by:
EC =
8
<
:
I + H   (I   A)   (H   I=2)   k if BC > I=2 ;
I + H   (I   A)   k if BC  I=2 :
(2)
The benets of a dispersed maturity structure are given by the dierence in equity values,
E  ED   EC, which is informative about the incentives for creating a granular debt structure:
E =
8
<
:
(H   I=2)   k if BC > I=2 ;
 k if BC  I=2 :
(3)
The comparison in equation (3) says that, for a suciently large amount of bonds (i.e. BC > I=2),
a dispersed maturity structure is preferred in the absence of transactions costs because of H > I=2.
This result accords with practitioners' concern about maturity concentrations.
In summary, the above model formalizes the intuition that rms may be unable to renance
expiring debt externally in some states of the world and are therefore forced to engage in ine-
cient liquidations. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, it can be
advantageous (depending on rm characteristics) to diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates.
The ineciency can also be interpreted as passing up valuable investment opportunities. To keep
the analysis focused, we have not considered other channels to avoid or manage rollover risk, but
we will consider the potential role of these alternatives in the empirical analysis (see Section 4.2).
The model generates a number of empirical predictions for a corporation's incentives to select
a concentrated or dispersed debt maturity prole. First, the potential benets of a dispersed ma-
turity structure increase with the probability of a market freeze, . Arguably, market freezes are
more likely during economic downturns or nancial crises. Second, dispersed debt maturities are
increasingly valuable when the project's net present value, H, rises. Put dierently, it is optimal
for a rm with more protable projects as measured, e.g., by a higher value of Tobin's Q, to have
a more spread out maturity structure. Third, an increase in transaction costs, k, works in favor
of a more concentrated maturity structure. This implies that a rm with higher 
oatation and
illiquidity costs will have a lower incentive to implement a more dispersed maturity prole. Since
transaction costs are generally regarded to be inversely related to rm age and rm size, corporate
bond maturities should be more dispersed for larger and more mature rms.
There are additional observations that follow. Because a rm with a higher value of assets
in place, A, needs less debt nancing, the rollover problem in the  state vanishes for rm C if
8BC  I=2. Therefore, when leverage is suciently low, rm C dominates rm D. In other words,
bond maturity dates should be more dispersed for rms with higher leverage. Moreover, even
though we do not model cash 
ows from assets in place, observe that higher cash 
ows from assets
in place correspond, in a present value sense, to a higher value of assets in place. Hence maturity
proles should be more dispersed for rms with lower cash 
ows from assets in place. Finally,
notice that all of the above predictions should apply both to a comparison of rms with dierent
characteristics and to bond issuance decisions of a given rm through time.
3 Data Description
3.1 Data Sources
Corporate bond data are drawn from Mergent's Fixed Income Security Database (FISD), which
contains comprehensive data on over 140,000 corporate bond issues for all credit ratings. The FISD
includes xed income securities that already have a CUSIP or are likely to have one in the near fu-
ture. It also includes corporate bonds issued in private placements (e.g., Rule 144A securities). We
obtain issue dates, bond maturities, initial and historical amounts outstanding, and other relevant
information from FISD, which begins in the 1980s but becomes comprehensive in the early 1990s.
Accounting data are drawn from the annual COMPUSTAT tapes. These data sets enable us to
measure debt granularity and various rm characteristics for the 1991{2011 period. In addition,
we also employ the Capital IQ database for rms' usage of lines of credit. This results in a more
restricted sample, which only covers the 2002{2011 period. Following standard practice, we exclude
nancial rms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and winsorize the top
and bottom 0.5% of variables to minimize the impact of data errors and outliers.
3.2 Variable Construction
Using bond maturity data from FISD, we construct two dierent measures of granularity. The
rst one is based on a concentration index. For each rm, we group debt maturities into the
nearest integer years, i, and multiply principal amounts in each year, ai, by weights xi to get
weighted principal amounts for each maturity. The weights, xi, can capture the idea that rms are
more concerned about rollover risk from shorter maturities (see, e.g., Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell
(2012)). For each debt maturity i, we then calculate the fraction of principal amounts outstanding,
9wi = (xi ai)=
P
i(xi ai), to compute the Herndahl index, HERF =
P
i w2
i.9 We examine two
dierent weighting schemes. The rst scheme places more weight on the fractions of shorter debt
maturities. Specically, for maturities less than or equal to 25 years, we use xi = (1
i)=(
P25
i=1
1
i) and,
for maturities greater than 25 years, we use xi = 0. The second scheme employs equal weights for
all debt maturities of the same rm (i.e. xi = 1). Since the empirical results are qualitatively sim-
ilar, we report results in the subsequent sections only for the rst scheme, which puts more weight
on earlier rather than later maturities. The ndings for the unadjusted fractions are available from
the authors upon request.
The second measure is based on the distance of the observed maturity prole from the perfectly
dispersed one. For each rm j with average maturity m in the sample, we envision a hypothetical
rm that has a perfectly dispersed maturity prole with the same average maturity m as rm j.
The average maturity of a rm with a perfectly dispersed maturity prole (i.e. a constant fraction of
debt expiring each period) is given by: m = 1
n
P
i i. Applying the summation formula and solving
for n yields that the perfectly dispersed rm would have n = 2m 1 debt obligations (with dierent
maturities) outstanding. This hypothetical rm would roll over a constant fraction 1=n of its total
debt each period (i.e. replace debt issued n periods ago by new debt with maturity n). We therefore
calculate the mean squared deviation of rm j's actual maturity prole from the perfectly dispersed
one: DIST = 1
tmax
j
Ptmax
j
i=1
 
wi   1
2m 1
2 where wi is the (unadjusted) fraction of principal amounts
outstanding with equal weights (i.e. xi = 1) and tmax
j is the longest debt maturity of rm j.10
To capture dispersion rather than concentration or distance, we dene the following granularity
measures: inverse of the Herndahl index, GRAN1  1=HERF, and negative value of the log of
the squared distance from perfect dispersion, GRAN2   log(DIST).11 We use the maturity
structure of corporate bonds from FISD rather than the maturity structure of total debt, which
includes bank loans, because rollover frictions are more relevant for bonds than for loans. The results
are similar when we extend the analysis to the maturity structure of total debt (see Section 4.6).
To investigate the empirical predictions from Section 2, we include a number of explanatory and
control variables in our regression specications. The explanatory variables include market-to-book
9For examining corporate bonds' in
uence on role of credit default swaps, Oehmke and Zawadowski (2012) also
use a Herndahl index as a proxy for the fragmentation of a rms total bonds outstanding.
10In an earlier version of the paper, we also proxy maturity dispersion based on an inequality index (Atkinson
(1970)). The results (available from the authors upon request) are qualitatively identical.
11Similar to Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), we add 0.001 to DIST to prevent GRAN2 from being negative
innity.
10(Q), rm size (Size), rm age (Age), leverage (Lev), and protability (Prof). We provide details
on the construction of all variables used in this study in Appendix B.
3.3 Summary Statistics and Stylized Facts
Table 3 contains the summary statistics for our sample of 2,477 rms over the 1991{2011 period,
for which we have 17,396 rm-year observations. The sample consists of large rms with signicant
leverage, because rms are required to have corporate bonds outstanding to enter the sample. For
example, the average (median) book assets are $7.65 ($1.69) billion, and the average (median) lever-
age ratio is 0.28 (0.24). In addition, in the sample, bonds account for the majority of debt nancing.
On average, 65% of debt consists of corporate bonds (see BondPct). The distribution of principal
amounts, BondAmt, is informative about the plausibility of xed costs associated with bond is-
suance. Typical issue sizes of bonds are quite large with a median of $150 million and an average
of $208.8 million. Observe also that the interquartile range of BondAmt starts at $87.5 million and
ends at $250 million. The fact that 75% of the bonds in our sample have a face value greater than
$87.5 million is consistent with the presence of a xed cost element associated with bond issuance.
Table 4 documents statistics on key variables for tercile groups dened by the empirical dis-
tributions of granularity, bond percentage, and debt maturity. The table reveals that there is
observed heterogeneity in debt granularity across tercile groups. In the GRAN1 tercile groups, for
example, the lowest granularity rms have on average 1.17 bonds outstanding (see NBond) and the
Herndahl-based granularity measure (GRAN1) equals 1.00. In contrast, the highest granularity
rms have on average 13.76 bonds outstanding with GRAN1 value of 3.77. If one assumes equal
principal amounts outstanding for the rst fourteen years, then the perfectly granular rm would
have GRAN1  6:7. Thus, the Herndahl-based granularity measure of 3.77 suggests that debt
structures are not perfectly granular even for rms with the largest number of bonds outstanding.12
For the GRAN2 tercile groups, the lowest granularity rms have GRAN2 = 2:18, which translates
to an average standard deviation from perfect granularity of 33.5%, whereas the highest granularity
rms' corresponding standard deviation from the perfect granularity is only 9.15%. The sample
properties are similar when we use GRAN2 to stratify the data in columns 4{6 of Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 here]
12The interpretation of the unadjusted GRAN1 measure (not reported) is more straightforward in that a perfectly
granular rm with n bonds outstanding would have GRAN1 equal to n because then GRAN1 is the inverse of
the Herndahl index. If the rm has a more concentrated debt structure, e.g., n bonds with dierent face values,
GRAN1 will be less than n but cannot be less than one. For this reason, GRAN1 tends to be positively skewed.
11These subsamples reveal that there is substantial variation in debt granularity and, at the same
time, that rms do not appear to completely spread out their debt maturity dates. In particular,
we highlight that a large number of rms have very concentrated maturity structures. In the tercile
group based on GRAN1, for example, 8,415 out of 17,253 rm-year observations have perfectly
concentrated debt structure, because one is a lower bound for GRAN1. These rm-year observa-
tions are not all composed of single-bond rms, as seen from the average number of bonds, which
is 1.17. In addition, we document that these rms issue large bonds relative to their assets. In
the low tercile group based on GRAN1, the average bond amount with respect to assets is 0.28,
whereas that for the high tercile is only 0.04. In addition, these rms are relatively younger (average
age is 17 years) and smaller, but are similar to higher tercile rms in other dimensions. If rms
matched the maturities of their liabilities to their assets for all projects (according to the matching
principle), then we should observe a large number of bonds and a high level of granularity for all
tercile groups, because rms tend to have many projects that begin (and end) at dierent points
in time. However, the evidence in this table does not support this view.
This substantial variation in debt maturity proles does not seem to be explained by bank loans.
In other words, rms do not complement concentration in bond maturities with loan maturities.
For the tercile groups based on corporate bonds' percentages of total debt outstanding in colums
7{9 of Table 4, the high BondPct group has a bond percentage of 97%, meaning that almost all of
their debt nancing is through bonds. In this group rms have, on average, 4.7 bonds outstanding
but a GRAN1 value of only 1.85, which clearly suggests that their bond maturity structures are still
relatively concentrated. Moreover, we also observe from the granularity-based tercile groups that
the variation in e.g. GRAN1 is not much dierent for GRAN1L, which includes COMPUSTAT's
maturity variables to re
ect private debt granularity.13 That is, for both granularity-based tercile
groups, higher bond maturity dispersion is associated with higher debt maturity dispersion.
How do rms with concentrated maturity structures manage rollover risk? Although we do not
consider other channels for managing rollover risk in our theoretical framework, rms might, in
practice, use them too. That is, concentrated rms could hoard larger cash balances, issue more
equity, or have more lines of credit. We nd evidence for such substitution eects in Table 4 in that
low-granularity rms tend to have greater cash balances (Cash), larger credit lines (LCLimit), and
more equity issuances (EqIssue). For example, cash holding, lines of credit, and equity issuances
13See Appendix B or Section 4.6 for the construction of GRAN1L and GRAN2L.
12are, on average, 0.14 (0.07), 0.18 (0.11), and 0.03 (0.01) in the low (high) GRAN1 tercile group.
Finally, the last three columns of Table 4 consider tercile groups based on debt maturity. Two
observations can be made. First, perhaps not surprisingly, rms with longer debt maturities tend
to have more granular debt structures, possibly because they have a wider range of issuance choices.
Second, asset maturity (AssetMat) is neither clearly increasing with nor reliably related to debt
maturity. For the low, mid, and high terciles, average maturity is 3.91, 7.60, and 15.90, respec-
tively, whereas average asset maturity is similar across the terciles, 4.15, 6.09, and 5.87. Despite
the limitations of interpreting these statistics, it seems unlikely that the intuitive idea behind the
maturity matching principle strongly in
uences rms' behavior in the data.
Figure 2 plots time-series averages of debt maturity dispersion for issuing and non-issuing rms.
For issuing rms, maturity dispersion is countercyclical, i.e. rms issue bonds to make maturity
structures more dispersed during recessions. Increased rollover risk during recessions appears to
push rms towards more dispersed debt structures, even though costs of issuance are typically
higher in these periods. Thus, rms clearly manage debt maturity dispersion over the business
cycle. This business cycle pattern is also consistent with our model, because in recessions the
probability of a market freeze, , is likely to be higher.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Summarizing, we have established several stylized facts. First, there is a lot of variation in
granularity across rms. This variation is largely insensitive to the fraction of the rm's private
debt. Second, many rms have relatively concentrated maturity proles, although they could have
chosen more dispersed ones, which suggests that they evaluate costs and benets of debt gran-
ularity. Third, average granularity also varies considerably over time (e.g., with macroeconomic
conditions). Finally, matching debt maturities with asset maturities does not seem to explain ob-
served debt granularity. In the subsequent sections, we analyze debt granularity and bond issuance
across rms and across time in more detail.
4 Empirical Analysis of Debt Granularity
We have argued in Section 2 that rms face trade-os when they manage their maturities over time.
This implies that dierent rms will follow dierent strategies depending on their characteristics,
which is broadly conrmed by the heterogeneity of debt granularity observed in Section 3. In this
13section, we examine whether rm characteristics that proxy for dierent incentives for granularity
management are reliably related to observed variation in the dispersion of debt maturity structures.
4.1 Baseline Regressions
We begin by estimating the following baseline regression:
GRANi;t+1 = Xi;t + i + yt + i;t+1 (4)
where Xi;t is a vector of explanatory and control variables, i is an industry- or rm-level xed
eect, yt is a year xed eect. As the explanatory variable, we consider proxies that capture the
forces described in our model. Specically, we include market-to-book (Q), leverage (Lev), rm size
(Size), rm age (Age), and protability (Prof) as explanatory variables, given that these variables
are related to debt granularity according to our framework in Section 2. In an extended baseline
specication, we add the following control variables. We use tangibility (Tan) to control for the ef-
fect of pledgeable assets on maturity dispersion. We include average maturity (BondMat), because
we want to study the incremental eect of rm characteristics on maturity dispersion. Finally, cash

ow volatility (ProfV ol) might aect a rm's ability to rollover its debt, so we include it too.
Debt granularity may be aected by unobservable rm or industry characteristics and also vary
within rms over time (e.g., due to granularity management through recapitalization). We there-
fore include either industry- or rm-level xed eects to examine the extent to which unmeasured
characteristics (or proxies) aect across- or within-rm variation in granularity.14 Recall that Fig-
ure 2 suggests that bond issuance decisions could depend on macroeconomic variables, so we allow
for year xed eects too. Note that a term structure measure (see, e.g., Johnson (2003)) or an
aggregate supply measure of Treasury bonds (see, e.g., Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010)) is
absorbed by year xed eects, so our tests control for these considerations. We allow for clustering
of standard errors at the rm level and note that the results are robust to using industry-level
clustering of standard errors.
Table 5 gives the estimation results of equation (4) for the measures GRAN1 (in the left panel)
and GRAN2 (in the right panel). Overall, the estimated coecients are mostly statistically signif-
icant, and their explanatory power is large. For example, in the rst columns of the table for both
granularity measures, all the variables are signicant at the 1% level. Also, the R2 is quite high, i.e.
14We employ the Fama-French 49 industry classication. The results are robust to other industry specication, for
example, two-digit SIC codes.
140.369 and 0.488 for GRAN1 and GRAN2, respectively. The economic signicance is also sizable.
Consider, for instance, the coecient estimate of 0.20 on the market-to-book ratio (Q) in the rst
column of Table 5. It implies that a one standard deviation change (0.99) in the market-to-book
ratio changes GRAN1 by 0.2, which corresponds to a 10.5% change relative to the sample average
of GRAN1 (1.90) in Table 3.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Furthermore, the relation between the explanatory variables and debt maturity dispersion is
consistent with our arguments in Section 2. The market-to-book ratio is reliably positively asso-
ciated with maturity dispersion across all specications for both of the granularity measures and
with or without various xed eects. This evidence supports the implication of our model that
rms with more valuable growth opportunities have a higher incentive to spread out their bonds'
maturity dates across time to protect their valuable projects from ineciencies.
The coecient estimates on rm size (Size), as measured by log of total book assets, are reliably
positive across all specications in Table 5. Economically, rm size is highly signicant. Observe
that, given a one standard deviation change in log of total assets (1.63), the dependent variable is
predicted to change by about 0.8 according to the rst columns for each granularity measure. Firm
age (Age) is also positively related to maturity dispersion, although its eect becomes weaker and
statistically insignicant when we include rm xed eects. Overall, these ndings are consistent
with the prediction that small, young rms are plagued by high transaction costs, and are therefore
not able to spread out their bonds' maturity dates across time.15
Leverage (Lev) is also positively associated with granularity. Although consistent with our
prediction, this result can be partly due to endogeneity between granularity and leverage. Firms
might consider bond amounts and bond maturity simultaneously when making issuance decisions.
We consider endogeneity in Section 4.4 by using instrumental variable regressions.
Cash 
ow (Prof) is negatively associated with granularity, which is also consistent with the
trade-o derived in Section 2. Intuitively, rms with lower cash 
ows want to avoid having to
repay large amounts of debt at one point in time. We note that the negative coecient estimate
on cash 
ow is also consistent with signaling in the sense that \good types" want to separate from
\bad types" by exposing themselves to rollover risk, because they are in a better position to handle
15To validate our assumption that size and age proxy for issuance costs, we perform in untabulated results
an analysis of gross spreads, the commissions paid to underwriters. Given issue amounts, we nd a statistically
signicant, negative relation between rm size (or rm age) and gross spreads.
15rollover problems. This interpretation of the relation between cash 
ow and granularity is in line
with Diamond's (1991) argument that links liquidity risk to debt maturity.
Moving to the extended baseline specication with control variables indicates that tangibility,
maturity, and cash 
ow volatility are positively associated with granularity. However, these control
variables do not reduce the explanatory power of the rm characteristics suggested by the model in
Section 2. For example, the reliably positive coecient for BondMat conrms that a rm's average
bond maturity imposes a restriction on its granularity (i.e. a rm that cannot issue longer maturities
cannot spread out its maturities over as many dates as an otherwise identical rm that can). While
this eect is statistically signicant, it by no means explains the relation between granularity and
the main explanatory variables. This underscores the robustness of our baseline results.
In sum, the evidence in Table 5 establishes that rm characteristics, such as Q, Size, Age, Lev,
and Prof, are strongly related to debt maturity dispersion in a way consistent with our model.
These variables' statistical signicance is mostly unaected by inclusion of dierent combinations of
xed eects. This shows that our variables measure granularity variation even after controlling for
unobservable heterogeneity. The remainder of this section studies several alternative specications
and robustness tests for these baseline results.
4.2 Other Channels for Managing Rollover Risk
In practice, there are several mechanisms other than maturity dispersion to manage rollover risk.
That is, rms with concentrated maturity proles (see Table 4) may rely on other channels of
rollover risk management, which we have not considered in Section 2. In this section, we examine
how rms' use of these channels is related to granularity.
The rst channel we consider is corporate cash holdings. Given potential losses from higher
rollover risk, rms would like to carry cash from good to bad states if their net worth enables them
to do so. Recall that a suciently high net worth eliminates the ineciency in Section 2. Another
channel is equity issuance, which can also solve the rm's problem in Section 2. Although equity
issuances are in general relatively expensive, rms could use equity issuances to avoid ineciencies.
We measure cash holdings, Cash, by cash divided by total assets and equity issuance, EqIssue, by
common or preferred stock sales divided by total assets.
The third channel relates broadly to lines of credit. Firms with lines of credit can better with-
stand rollover risk and hence may have concentrated debt structures to reduce bond issuance costs.
16For short-term debt rollovers, rms typically utilize lines of credit and reclassify short-term debt
as long-term debt. We adopt the measure Rec from Chang, Chen, and Dasgupta (2010), which is
dened as reclassied short-term debt under SFAS No. 6 divided by total assets.16 According to
Chang, Chen, and Dasgupta (2010), reclassied debt is almost always accompanied by credit lines,
and thus this measure should capture rms' ability to manage rollover risk through credit lines.
In addition, we employ direct measures of credit lines. We obtain data on rms' total credit lines
available from Capital IQ. The database facility amounts are for bank overdraft, letters of credit
outstanding, and revolving credit. We aggregate these facility amounts for each rm and each year
to get total lines of credit available. Our measure for lines of credit is LimitLC, which is total lines
of credit available divided by total assets.
To examine whether these channels are related to debt granularity, we include Cash, LimitLC,
Rec, and EqIssue in our baseline specication (4) as independent variables. The results are re-
ported in Table 6. Several observations follow. First, cash holdings are not reliably related to
our granularity measures. These results suggest that rms do not hoard cash to deal with rollover
risk, possibly because cash holdings are relatively expensive. Second, the results in the second and
third columns of the table suggest that rms reliably use credit lines and debt reclassications to
manage rollover risk of bonds. That is, LimitLC and Rec are negatively related to granularity
with statistical signicance levels close to or better than 1%. Consistent with Chang, Chen, and
Dasgupta (2010), we therefore nd that rms also seem to employ lines of credit to manage rollover
risk. Finally, rms do not appear to rely on equity issuances to manage rollover risk. This result
is in line with the notion that equity issuances are even costlier than carrying cash.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In sum, the results suggest that, in addition to spreading out debt maturity dates over time,
rms use other channels of rollover risk management. Firms with signicant amounts of credit
lines available tend to have concentrated debt structures, because they are more likely to roll over
expiring debt without incurring ineciencies and hence can economize on bond issuance costs.
4.3 Number and Type of Bonds
While our main variables are strongly associated with debt granularity, this does not rule out
the possibility that rms do not consider debt granularity when making bond issuance decisions.
16We are grateful to Yunling Chen and Sudipto Dasgupta for providing us with the data.
17Accordingly, one might be tempted to argue that larger, more mature rms with higher leverage
simply have more bonds outstanding. In addition, rms with better investment opportunities could
have issued more bonds because of higher nancing needs. Firms with many bonds outstanding
probably have granular debt structures, because they are more likely to (or just randomly) issue
bonds with dierent maturity dates, which would explain our baseline ndings. This would be
especially true if rms adhered to the matching principle. According to this interpretation, the
rm characteristics we consider are associated with granularity through the number of bonds out-
standing. If this is true, then the granularity measures would only pick up the eect of the number
of bonds outstanding. Thus, controlling for the number of bonds outstanding should signicantly
weaken our baseline results.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Similar to Table 5, the left panel of Table 7 is for GRAN1 and the right panel is for GRAN2.
In the rst columns of the two panels, we examine whether our main explanatory variables are
still reliably related to our granularity measures after including the number of bonds (NBond).
The columns show that the results are largely the same. The coecients do not change much
after controlling for the number of bonds. In the second columns of each panel in Table 7, we
use as a dependent variable the residuals from the regression of granularity on the number of
bonds to further control for the potential in
uence of variation in the number of bonds on debt
granularity. The results are again very similar to the baseline results in Table 5. Overall, these
robustness checks indicate that our main explanatory variables are signicantly associated with
debt granularity management even after controlling for the number of bonds outstanding.
Since there is a signicant number of rms with only one bond outstanding, it is possible that
the baseline results in Table 5 are mainly driven by these rms. If single-bond rms are not able
to issue multiple bonds with dierent maturities for reasons not captured by the control variables,
then having too many single-bond rms in the sample can be problematic. Moving to the columns
labeled \N >= 2" in Table 7 reveals that the results for rms with at least two bonds outstanding
are similar to the ones for the full sample. In fact, the economic signicance of the main explana-
tory variables, such as market-to-book, size, leverage, and protability, tends to be higher for this
subsample of rms. Thus, the results in Table 5 are not driven by rm-year observations for which
only one bond is outstanding.
Finally, in the center columns of the two panels in Table 7, we exclude rms that have more
18than 80% of their total bond amounts in bonds with option features and sinking fund provisions.
Since eective maturities for bonds with options and sinking funds are likely to be much shorter
than for straight bonds, re-estimating equation (4) for the subsample that is composed mostly of
straight bonds is potentially more informative. Indeed, the columns \Straight" report stronger or
similar relations between the granularity measures and the explanatory variables (i.e. the economic
and statistical signicance levels are larger in this subsample compared to the full sample).
4.4 Instrumental Variable Regressions
In Section 4.1, we nd that leverage is positively and reliably related to granularity, which treats
leverage as an exogenous variable and granularity as an endogenous variable. In reality, however,
these variables are likely to be determined jointly and subject to the longest available maturity.
That is, rms are likely to make nancing decisions by considering the level of leverage along with
the rst two moments of maturity (i.e. average maturity and dispersion of maturity) simultaneously.
In this subsection, we address these concerns by performing two-stage least-squares (2SLS)
regressions. Specically, we instrument leverage and maturity by including exogenous variables in
addition to the other explanatory variables and controls. The additional exogenous variables need to
aect granularity indirectly through leverage and maturity (but not directly). The rst instrument
is issuer-level credit rating. Rating agencies consider mainly debt coverage and cash 
ows to rate
rms. As such, granularity is likely to be of little or no importance in determining credit ratings.
This observation implies that rating is associated with granularity primarily through leverage and
maturity. The second instrument is asset maturity. Asset maturity in
uences granularity mostly
through average debt maturity but is unlikely to have a direct eect on granularity. Johnson (2003)
and Saretto and Tookes (2012) also employ asset maturity as an instrument for debt maturity. In
our implementation of the 2SLS estimations, we employ both of these instruments.17
Columns IV of Table 7 report the results from the 2SLS regressions using asset maturity and
credit rating as instruments. We report the results based on rm xed eects. The results show
that instrumenting leverage and maturity sharpens the coecient estimates on the key variables
compared to the baseline results. For example, the eect of Q and Prof almost doubles in the left
panel for GRAN1.18 All the explanatory variables are statistically signicant at the same levels
17In untabulated results, we include industry leverage as the third instrument, similar to Saretto and Tookes (2012).
The results are qualitatively the same.
18This suggests that mangers are concerned about rollover risk in that they select low leverage and high granularity
simultaneously. This endogeneity creates a downward bias of the coecients in our baseline regressions of Table 5.
19as in Table 5 with the exception of Age in case of GRAN1, where Age is still signicant at the
10% level. Taken together, these results provide further evidence of the trade-o in Section 2 that
motivates rms' incentives to manage the granularity of their debt.
4.5 Industry Granularity
Given that asset maturity is more homogeneous within an industry, it seems plausible that industry
granularity should diminish the importance of some of the explanatory variables of the baseline re-
gressions in Table 5, especially if rms match maturities of their liabilities with those of their assets
(i.e. use the matching principle). So we consider in the last columns of Table 7 the possibility that
industry granularity explains our baseline results. It turns out that IndGRAN is economically and
statistically signicant, when we add it to the regression specications for GRAN1 and GRAN2.
However, it does not strongly in
uence the relations between granularity and rm characteristics,
which we report in Table 5. In fact, the estimation results in the last columns of Table 7 suggest
that rm characteristics, such as market-to-book or leverage, are independently important. We
conclude that some but by no means all variation in granularity is driven by industry granularity
and that these ndings provide little support to the matching principle in our sample.
4.6 Including Private Debt in Granularity Measures
Our empirical analysis largely focuses on bond maturity proles, because rollover frictions are likely
to be smaller for private debt, such as bank loans. Recall that private debt is commonly and fre-
quently renegotiated (see, e.g., Roberts and Su (2009)) and that the maturity of private debt is
more easily manageable (see, e.g., Mian and Santos (2011)). In addition, bank loans are avail-
able in relatively small increments, meaning that our arguments do not apply very well to private
debt. On the other hand, corporate bonds, which are mostly public debt and characterized by a
dispersed, anonymous ownership structure, are dicult to renegotiate once issued, are associated
with sizable issue costs, and have large minimum issue sizes. In particular, Blackwell and Kidwell
(1988) and Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) nd that issuance costs are larger for
public debt than for private debt, which includes bank loans. In addition, Carey et al. (1993) nd
that public debt is cost-eective only above $100 million, while bank debt and non-bank private
debt are cost-eective even for smaller issues. As a result, private debt maturity dispersion is less
precisely measured and also less relevant for the arguments developed in Section 2.
20Nonetheless, we examine whether our results are robust to inclusion of private debt maturities,
and calculate granularity measures based on total instead of public debt maturities. To this end,
we augment the corporate bond maturity structures from FISD by debt maturity variables from
COMPUSTAT. Specically, for maturities less than ve years, we collect debt maturity information
available in COMPUSTAT (DD1 to DD5). These COMPUSTAT variables include both public
and private debt expiring in less than or equal to ve years. For maturities greater than ve
years, we employ bond amounts available in FISD. We then combine debt amounts from these two
sources to calculate granularity measures of rms' total debt. Given that most bank loans have
stated maturities of less than ve years, this procedure should generate fairly good proxies for debt
granularity that capture both public and private debt maturity dispersion. 19
To begin, notice that the descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that bond granularity (i.e.
GRAN1 or GRAN2) is largely unaected by incorporating maturity proles from COMPUSTAT
to compute total debt granularity (i.e. GRAN1L or GRAN2L). More importantly, we re-estimate
equation (4) using the granularity measures that include private debt as dependent variables. The
regression results based on these measures are gathered in the fth columns of Table 7. As seen in
the \Loans" columns, most of the explanatory variables are statistically signicant and their signs
are consistent with the ones predicted by the model in Section 2. Overall, these results indicate
that the rm characteristics we consider are also associated with total granularity.
4.7 Proportion of Private Debt
In addition to the results provided in Table 7 for including private debt maturity proles into
our granularity measures, we further examine the impact of private debt on public debt granular-
ity. Recall that debt renegotiation is very common for private debt, so realized maturity is much
shorter than contracted maturity (see, e.g., Roberts and Su (2009)). As a result, rms with a
large proportion of bank loans may not need to spread out the maturity dates of their corporate
bonds. Put dierently, since private debt is easier to adjust and renegotiate than public debt, rms
might eectively maintain a high degree of total debt maturity dispersion by managing bank debt
dispersion, but leaving bond maturity structures less dispersed. In addition, some components of
private debt, such as credit lines, are useful for managing rollover risk.
To examine this substitution hypothesis, we estimate the model in equation (4) for low and
19To validate this approach, we have examined maturities of bank loans for the limited sample (2002 onwards) using
Standard & Poor's Capital IQ data. We nd that more than 85% of bank loans have maturities shorter than 5 years.
21high bank debt subsamples. That is, we investigate in Table 8 whether a larger fraction of bank
debt aects rms' granularity decisions. Firms are categorized as low bank loan rms if corporate
bonds in FISD account for more than 50% of their total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities in COMPUSTAT), and they are categorized as high bank loan rms otherwise. Notably,
the estimation results for both subsamples are qualitatively similar to the full sample results. Thus,
the baseline results in Table 5 are robust to variation in the proportion of private debt. Consistent
with the nding in Section 4.6, these results suggest that granularity is mainly relevant for public
debt, which supports our arguments in Section 2.
[Insert Table 8 here]
4.8 Granularity during the Financial Crisis
During the recent nancial crisis, most rms probably faced substantially increased rollover risk.
Almeida et al. (2012), for example, document that rms with long-term debt maturing during the
nancial crisis had to decrease investments. We therefore examine whether rms' incentives to
implement a more dispersed maturity structure are stronger during the 2008{2009 nancial crisis.
Table 9 reports estimation results of equation (4) for the 2008{2009 crisis period and for the non-
crisis period (i.e. 1991 to 2007 and 2010 to 2011). Compared to the non-crisis period, the eect of Q
is more precisely measured in the crisis subsample for both granularity measures (i.e. the t-statistics
are similar but there is a substantial dierence in the number of observations between the two sub-
samples). In addition, the economic eect of investment opportunities on granularity rises consider-
ably during the crisis. For example, the coecient estimate on Q in the fourth column of GRAN1
with rm xed eects is 0.54, compared to 0.22 for the non-crisis period in the third column. In
untabulated results, the dierences in coecients between the two subsamples are in most cases
statistically signicant at the 1% level. These estimation results suggest that given the higher likeli-
hood of investment ineciencies due to rollover risk during the crisis, especially rms with valuable
investment opportunities (as measured by a higher Q) selected reliably higher maturity dispersions.
[Insert Table 9 here]
4.9 Partial Adjustment and Target Granularity
The regression specication (4) assumes implicitly that observed maturity dispersion is also rms'
target dispersion. In a world without adjustment costs, this would be plausible. With adjustment
22costs, however, realized dispersion is likely to deviate from its target level, and rms will typically
make partial adjustments towards their targets. If rms manage granularity, then it will revert to
target levels rapidly. In contrast, if there is no target granularity, or if adjustment costs are too
high, then rms are passive and adjustment speeds should be slow.
In this section, we account for the time-varying nature of target maturity dispersion and partial
adjustments by estimating the following speed-of-adjustment (SOA) regression of debt granularity:
GRANi;t+1 = 
(Xi;t   GRANi;t) + i;t+1; (5)
where Xi;t is a vector of explanatory variables, such as Q, Size, Age, Lev, and Prof. So, Xi;t
denotes target maturity dispersion and  
 is the speed of adjustment towards target dispersion.
Table 10 displays again results separately for GRAN1 and GRAN2. The rst columns for
GRAN1 and GRAN2 present the OLS estimation results with industry and year xed eects. The
estimated SOA coecients are 0.21 and 0.30 for GRAN1 and GRAN2, respectively. Economically,
these estimates on lagged granularity imply that the half lives of excess granularity are between 2.94
to 1.94 years. Moreover, the estimated SOA coecients are statistically highly signicant, which
indicates that rms have target granularity levels and are involved in the management of granularity.
[Insert Table 10 here]
These relatively low adjustment speeds can be due to unobservable rm-specic heterogeneity
in target granularity. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we include rm and year xed eects.
With xed eects, the SOA estimates increase substantially. In the second column for GRAN1,
for example, the coecient on lagged GRAN1 equals 0.41. At this high rate of adjustment, rms
close the dispersion gap, on average, by 41% within one year. In untabulated results, an F-test
for the joint signicance of the xed eects rejects the hypothesis that these terms are all equal,
supporting heterogeneity in granularity targets.
The rapid adjustment speeds with xed eect estimations require careful interpretation, be-
cause coecient estimates are inconsistent in a dynamic panel model with xed eects. To address
this issue, we employ panel GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991) and double-dierencing estima-
tion of Han and Phillips (2010) in Table 10. In the third column for GRAN1 the estimated SOA
coecient based on Arellano and Bond (1991) is 0.54, which indicates that a typical rm adjusts
approximately 54% of maturity dispersion towards its target dispersion within one year. The SOA
23estimate for GRAN1 based on Han and Pillips (2010) is 0.25, which is smaller than that based on
Arellano and Bond (1991). These results for consistent estimates of SOA coecients also suggest
that rms manage debt granularity toward target granularity.
In addition to the SOA estimates in the rst line, Table 10 provides coecient estimates for
(
)Xi;t, which allow us to deduce maturity dispersion targets as a function of rm characteristics.
Note that the estimated dispersion targets conrm the predictions from our theory in most cases.
Tobin's Q, rm size, leverage, and protability are reliably related to target dispersion across all
the models considered in a way that is consistent with our hypotheses.
Overall, the SOA test results lead us to conclude that rms manage debt maturity dispersion.
The speed with which rms make adjustments towards granularity targets is fairly high, implying
that rms regard maturity dispersion management as important. Furthermore, granularity targets
are explained by rm characteristics in ways that are in line with the predictions of our model and
that are also consistent with the baseline results in Section 5.1.
5 Granularity Management through Bond Issuance
In this section, we provide evidence on the management of the dispersion of debt maturities through
bond issuance. Specically, we ask the following question: how important is maturity dispersion
when rms determine the maturity of newly-issued bonds?
To answer this question, we investigate whether discrepancies between a rm's pre-existing
maturity prole and a benchmark maturity prole (based on rm characteristics implied by our
model) explain future bond issue behavior. In other words, we conduct time-series tests, which are
informative about whether newly-issued bonds' maturities are consistent with debt maturity dis-
persion management. For this purpose, we estimate a binomial choice regression for each maturity
bucket j = 1;2;:::;7 for each new issue of bonds:
Prob(I
j
it) = a1m1
it + a2m2
it + a3m3
it + a4m4
it + a5m5
it + a6m6
it + a7m7
it ; (6)
where I
j
it is a dummy variable for bond issuance of rm i at time t and m1
it to m7
it are deviations
of the issuing rm's maturity prole from its benchmark prole. The maturity buckets are dened
as follows. For maturities shorter than 10 years (1  j  5), there are ve two-year buckets, each
from 2j   1 to 2j years. For maturities longer than 10 years, there are two maturity buckets, one
for 11 to 20 years and the other one for 21 years or longer.
24The dependent variable is the bond issuance (dummy) variable, I
j
it, which equals one if the
newly issued bond's amount is greater than a cut-o level and if its maturity falls into bucket j and
equals zero otherwise.20 We estimate a linear probability model for each maturity bucket j, because
the economic magnitude of coecient estimates are easier to interpret. In untabulated results, we
estimate a probit model and obtain remarkably similar results. Industry and year xed eects are
included in the estimation.21 Any economy-wide supply side eects on rms' issuance are absorbed
by the year xed eect. Standard errors are clustered at the Fama-French 49 industry level.
The deviation of the rm's maturity prole from its benchmark prole is computed as follows.
Each rm's maturity prole is rst calculated as fractions of pre-existing bond amounts in each ma-
turity bucket j. To obtain the benchmark maturity prole, rms are sorted into high (top 50%) and
low (bottom 50%) groups based on the explanatory variables in Section 4 (i.e. Q, Size, Age, Lev,
and Prof) and average maturity (BondMat). This procedure yields 64 maturity prole groups.
The benchmark prole of each group is then obtained by averaging maturity proles in that group.
The deviation from the benchmark prole, m
j
it, is the dierence between rm i's maturity prole
and the benchmark prole of the group that the issuing rm belongs to.
If rms avoid maturity concentrations by managing bond issuances relative to benchmark pro-
les, then the probability of issuing a bond in the maturity bucket j should be negatively related to
the deviation of the rm's maturity prole in that bucket, m
j
it. This implies the following testable
hypothesis. The diagonal coecients, aj for j = 1;:::7, should be signicantly negative and, on
average, smaller than the o-diagonal coecients for the other maturity buckets, al, where l 6= j.
The estimation results in Panel A of Table 11 conrm the hypothesis. Panel A1 provides the
results for the sample of bonds with issue sizes greater than 3% of rms' total pre-existing bond
amounts. Except for the shortest maturity bucket (1 to 2 year), all diagonal coecients are negative
and statistically signicant at 1%, suggesting that rms engage in maturity dispersion management
by avoiding maturity towers. For the ve to six year maturity bucket, for example, the coecient
aj is -0.36. That is, the probability of issuing additional ve- or six-year maturity bonds drops
by 0.36 of a percentage point for every percentage point that a rm's maturity prole exceeds the
benchmark maturity prole in bucket 3. Perhaps because bank loans and other private debt are
confounding our analysis for shorter maturities, the weakest result is found at the shortest matu-
20We do not count bond exchanges due to Rule 144A securities as new issues. Many rms issue Rule 144A bonds
in private placements, which are exchanged later with near identical public bonds.
21Firm xed eects are inappropriate for our sample, as a number of rms issue only one bond in our sample period.
25rity bucket, which is still negative but not statistically signicant. Non-diagonal coecients are in
many cases positive and not signicant. The results in Panel A2 for the sample with the issue cuto
at 10% are even stronger, further conrming rms' motives to maintain dispersed bond maturity
structures when the relative size of the new issue is larger.
[Insert Table 11 here]
In addition, we examine in Table 11 if the diagonal coecients are smaller than the average of the
other six coecients in the same binomial choice regression (i.e. column). For this purpose, we test
the null hypothesis, H0: ai  1
6
P
n6=i an = 0, in the last rows of Table 11. The results reveal that the
diagonal coecients are always smaller than the average of non-diagonal coecients. The dierence
(ai   1
6
P
n6=i an) is negative across all maturity buckets, ranging from -0.05 to -0.30 in Panel A1.
Furthermore, they are all statistically signicant at the 5% level. When the 10% issue cuto is
used in Panel A2, the results are stronger with the hypothesis rejected in all cases at the 1% level.
In Panels B1 and B2 of Table 11, we perform the same tests after excluding all option-embedded
bonds, such as callable, convertible, and putable bonds, and bonds with sinking fund provisions, as
a robustness check. This exercise is important and informative because eective maturities could
be shorter with these option-embedded bonds. Compared to the results in Panels A1 and A2, the
results for the sample of straight bonds are slightly weaker but qualitatively very similar.
To summarize, rms manage maturity dispersion in that newly issued corporate bonds com-
plement pre-existing bond maturity proles. The ndings in this subsection reinforce the results
from the previous subsection. That is, they also support the view that rms manage debt maturity
dispersion, especially when they issue new bonds.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the existing literature by focusing on the dispersion of a rm's debt maturities
instead of its average debt maturity. Maturity structure matters due to rollover risk, i.e. the risk
that the rm may not be able to renance an expiring bond externally and thus may be forced to en-
gage in inecient asset sales or pass up valuable investment opportunities to repay the bondholders.
A rm with a dispersed maturity structure faces multiple small rollover risks, whereas a rm with a
concentrated maturity structure faces a single large rollover risk. Since multiple small asset sales are
less inecient than an equivalent single large asset sale, dispersed maturity structures are advanta-
26geous in the absence of transactions costs or illiquidity costs. Corporate debt maturities should be
more dispersed when access to external debt markets is more uncertain, for rms with more prof-
itable investment projects, for larger and more mature rms, with more tangible assets, with higher
leverage ratios, with lower values of assets in place, and with lower levels of current cash 
ows.
In a large panel of corporate bond issuers during the 1991{2009 period, we nd evidence that
supports our model's predictions in a number of dierent tests. Corporate debt maturities are more
dispersed and, in the time series, maturity dispersion adjusts faster for larger and more mature
rms, for rms with better investment opportunities, with more tangible assets, with higher lever-
age ratios, with lower values of assets in place, and with lower levels of current cash 
ows. Moreover,
during the recent nancial crisis when access to primary capital markets was dicult, we nd that
especially rms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more dispersed debt maturity
structures. In the time-series, we also document that rms actively manage dispersion of debt matu-
rity in that newly issued corporate bond maturities complement pre-existing bond maturity proles.
Taken together, the model's predictions and test results suggest several novel insights for the
joint choice of capital structure and debt structure. In essence, we establish that there is hetero-
geneity in how rms spread out their bonds' maturity dates across time and that recognition of
this heterogeneity has important implications for the determinants of capital structure across rms
and over time. More generally, we believe that our understanding of corporate nancial decision
making can be improved by recognizing the costs and benets associated with rms' decisions on
how many dierent types, sources, and maturities of debt to use. Finally, in this paper we have
largely focused on the corporate nance implications for debt granularity. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to explore the asset (i.e. debt or equity) pricing implications of debt granularity,
this should prove fruitful for future research.
27Appendix A. Model With Endogenous Market Freezes
In this appendix, we provide an extension of the model presented in Section 2 to endogenous market
freezes. We adjust the assumptions made in Section 2 in the following sense. First, of the nal cash

ow, I +H, only I is contractible, whereas H represents non-contractible growth options. Second,
at times t1 and t2, there is now a probability  with which the rm reaches a high-uncertainty state.
In this case, the rm becomes vulnerable to a technology shock. With probability  the technology
shock actually takes place at time t+
1 or t+
2 . In this case, the rm ceases to exist, and all cash 
ows
are lost. With probability 1    the technology shock does not follow the high-uncertainty state,
however, and the rm continues its projects as a going concern, just as in the low-uncertainty state
that arises with probability 1   .
As in Section 2, the rm issues straight one- or two-period bonds to raise the required capital of
I   A. Without loss of generality, rm D raises I A
2 by issuing a bond to be rolled over at time t1
and the remaining I A
2 by issuing a bond to be rolled over at time t2. It turns out that the former
bond is riskless, so its required face value equals I A
2 . The latter bond is risky, because the rm
may be hit by a technology shock at time t+
1 , and hence its required face value is therefore I A
2(1 ).
This ensures that bondholders break even in expectation. Firm C issues a single bond to be rolled
over at time t2. Since it is also risky, its face value must equal I A
1 .
If investors do not roll over an expiring bond in the high-uncertainty state, the rm must trans-
fer cash 
ows from time t3 to repay the bondholders. As before, this may be interpreted either as
an asset sale or as a cutback of investment at the time when the bond must be renanced. If rm
D needs to renance its bond at time t1 in the high-uncertainty state, it requires funds of I A
2
(=face value of debt expiring at time t1). To generate these funds, it must give up a cash 
ow at
time t3 of I A
2(1 )(1 ). Note that the present value of this cash 
ow is exactly I A
2 , since in the
high-uncertainty state at time t1 there is only a (1   )(1   ) chance that the rm will survive
without technology shock until time t3. Thus, generating funds of I A
2 at time t1 by reducing
investment or selling assets does not generate any deadweight losses, as it requires giving up a cash

ow at time t3 whose present value is exactly equal to I A
2 .
If rm D cannot renance its bond at time t2, it needs to generate funds equal to I A
2(1 ) (=face
value of debt expiring at time t2). We assume that this can be done by reducing investments or
selling assets that reduce time t3 cash 
ows by I A
2(1 )(1 ). Thus, as before, generating these funds
28does not create deadweight losses, since the reduction of time t3 cash 
ows exactly equals the funds
generated at time t2. We therefore assume without loss of generality that rm D always repays its
expiring debt in the high-uncertainty state by transferring the necessary cash 
ows from time t3.
Firm C needs to renance its bond at time t2. In the high-uncertainty state at time t2 investors
would be willing to contribute at most (1  )I to rm C, since with probability  the technology
shock materializes and all cash 
ows are lost, and H is not contractible. The amount required to
repay the face value of debt is I A
1  (=face value of rm C's bond). So, rm C is unable to renance
its bond in the high-uncertainty state at time t2 if the endogenous market freeze condition holds:
A <  [1 + (1   )]I : (A.1)
In this case, rm C must generate cash internally by selling assets or cutting back investment. We
assume that this is costly in the sense that the rm would need to give up all its cash 
ows at time
t3, I +H. Note that if leverage is larger (e.g. A is smaller or I is larger), then the left-hand side is
more likely to be smaller than the right-hand side and hence condition (A.1) is more likely to hold.
Depending on how uncertainty is resolved over time, there are seven possible paths along which
rms can evolve. Table 1 summarizes rm D's cash 
ows to equity net of debt payments for each
of these seven paths.
Table 1. Paths, Probabilities, and Cash Flows for Firm D
Paths Probabilities Cash Flows to Equity
(i)  0
(ii) (1   ) 0
(iii) (1   ) 0
(iv) (1   )(1   ) I + H   I A
(1 )(1 )
(v) (1   )(1   ) I + H   I A
2(1 )(1 )   I A
2(1 )
(vi) (1   )(1   ) I + H   I A
2(1 )   I A
2(1 )(1 )
(vii) (1   )(1   ) I + H   I A
1 
29Table 2 displays the cash 
ows to equityholders for rm C assuming that condition (A.1) holds.
If this condition does not hold, then it is easy to show that rm C's cash 
ows to equityholders are
identical to those of rm D, as given in Table 1.
Table 2. Paths, Probabilities, and Cash Flows for Firm C
Paths Probabilities Cash Flows to Equity
(i)  0
(ii) (1   ) 0
(iii) (1   ) 0
(iv) (1   )(1   ) 0
(v) (1   )(1   ) I + H   I A
1 
(vi) (1   )(1   ) 0
(vii) (1   )(1   ) I + H   I A
1 
We obtain equity values by multiplying cash 
ows to equityholders by their respective proba-
bilities, summing up, and recognizing that rm D's transactions costs are twice the ones incurred
by rm C. The equity value of rm D is thus given by:
ED = (1   )2(I + H)   (I   A)   2k : (A.2)
Equation (A.2) is easy to interpret. The rm generates the nal cash 
ow, I +H, with the proba-
bility that no technology shock occurs, i.e. (1   )2. And equityholders must repay debtholders
their contributed capital, I   A, in expectation. Finally, the transactions costs are 2k.
The equity value of rm C is given by:
EC = (1   )[(1   )(I + H)   (I   A)]   k : (A.3)
Equation (A.3) also shows that the nal payo, I+H, is only realized if no technology shock occurs
at time t1 (i.e. with probability of 1 ). However, at time t2 the nal payo is always lost in the
high-uncertainty state for rm C (i.e. it must be fully used to repay debt), not only when the tech-
nology shock occurs subsequently. So the nal payo arises only in the low-uncertainty state, which
30occurs with probability 1  . Notice that rm D generates the nal payo at time t2 with proba-
bility 1  > 1 , which is the sources of ineciency that is traded o against transaction costs.
The benets of a dispersed maturity structure are dened by the dierence in equity values,
E  ED   EC, which is informative about the incentives for creating a granular debt structure:
E =
8
<
:
[(1   )(1   )(I + H)   (I   A)]   k if condition (A.1) holds;
 k otherwise:
(A.4)
Equation (A.4) reveals that the model with endogenous market freezes yields the same testable
implications as the ones we discuss for the model with exogenous market freezes in Section 2.
Specically, it follows that the relative advantage of dispersed debt maturities increases with H
and that it decreases with k and A (i.e. condition (A.1) does not hold for a suciently large level
of A so that E becomes  k). Finally, it also follows from equation (A.4) that, for a suciently
high NPV, the relative benet of debt granularity increases with , i.e. the probability of the high-
uncertainty state. In addition to the model with exogenous market freezes, we can see that E
decreases with , i.e. the probability of a technology shock. Intuitively, the main benet of dispersed
debt maturity is to operate the rm's assets even during high-uncertainty times (i.e. the -states in
our model). However, if in high-uncertainty times the technology shock always materializes, then
the benet of debt granularity vanishes (formally, we have for high values of  that 1   1 ).
Appendix B. Variable Denitions
This appendix provides the variable construction of all the variables used in the study. All variables
in uppercase letters refer to the COMPUSTAT items.
GRAN1: inverse of weighted Herndahl index of bond maturity fractions (see Section
3.2).
GRAN2: negative of log distance from the perfect maturity dispersion (see Section 3.2).
GRAN1L: inverse of weighted Herndahl index of total debt maturity fractions based on
DD1 to DD5 and FISD's bond amounts for maturities greater than ve years
(see Section 4.6).
GRAN2L: negative of log distance from the perfect maturity dispersion based on DD1
to DD5 and FISD's bond amounts for maturities greater than ve years (see
Section 4.6).
31Q: market-to-book ratio, (AT + PRCC  CSHO   CDQ   TXDB)=AT.
Asset: total assets (AT) in million dollars.
Size: log of Asset.
Age: number of years in the COMPUSTAT le prior to observations.
Lev: market value of leverage, (DLTT + DLC)=(AT + PRCC  CSHO   CEQ  
TXDB)
Prof: operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets, OIBDP=AT.
Tan: plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets, PPENT=AT.
BondMat: average of rms' bond maturities weighted by amounts.
ProfV ol: standard deviation of operating income before depreciation divided by total
assets (OIBDP=AT) using the past ve years.
NBond: number of bonds outstanding.
BondPct: ratio of total book value of bonds available to total book debt for each rm.
BondAmt: average amount of bonds outstanding for each rm.
BondAmt=Asset: average amount of bonds outstanding divided by total assets.
Cash: cash holdings divided by total assets, CH=AT.
LimitLC: credit lines based on Capital IQ (for the 2002{2011 period) divided by total
assets AT (see Section 4.2).
EqIssue: sale of common and preferred stocks divided by total assets (SSTK=AT).
Rec: reclassied short-term debt under SFAS No. 6 divided by total assets.
AssetMat: the (book) value-weighted average of the maturities of current assets and net
property, plant and equipment, where the maturity of current assets is current
assets divided by the cost of goods sold (ACT=COGS), and the maturity of net
property, plant, and equipment is that amount divided by annual depreciation
expense (PPENT=DP).
IndGRAN: median values of granularity within Fama-French 49 industry groups each year.
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35Figure 2. Time Series of Debt Maturity Dispersion
This gure plots the time series of aggregate debt granularity measures, GRAN1 and GRAN2, for bond issuing
rms only and for all rms. GRAN1 is the inverse of the weighted Herndahl index of bond maturity fractions.
GRAN2 is the negative value of the log of the average, squared distance from the perfect maturity dispersion. To
obtain bond maturity fractions, we group bond maturities into the nearest integer years and compute their fractions
out of the total amount of bonds outstanding. To be included in the bond issuing sample, rms are required to have
at least one bond issued greater than 1% of existing bond amounts. Aggregate debt dispersion is the cross-sectional
average of individual rm-level granularity measures, GRAN1 and GRAN2. Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
36Table 3. Sample Descriptive Statistics
The sample is drawn from Mergent's Fixed Income Security Database (FISD) and the annual COMPUSTAT les,
excluding nancial and utility rms, for the period from 1991 to 2011. Panel A reports means, standard deviations,
25%, median, and 75% of main variables. GRAN1 is the inverse of the weighted Herndahl index of bond maturity
fractions. GRAN2 is the negative of the log distance from the perfect maturity dispersion. Asset is the total assets
in million dollars. Age is the number of years in the COMPUSTAT le prior to observations. Q is the market-to-book
ratio and Lev is the market value of leverage. Prof is protability (operating income divided by assets) .BondMat
is the average of rms' bond maturities weighted by amounts. NBond is the number of bonds outstanding for each
rm. BondPct is the ratio of total book value of bonds available in the FISD to total book debt in COMPUSTAT for
each rm. BondAmt is the average amount of bond issues outstanding for each rm. BondAmt=Asset is BondAmt
divided by total assets. Cash is cash holdings divided by assets. LimitLC is the total amount of credit lines available
divided by assets and EqIssue is sale of common and preferred stocks divided by assets.
Mean Stdev 25% Median 75%
GRAN1 1.90 1.33 1.00 1.09 2.30
GRAN2 3.15 1.25 2.06 2.92 4.02
Asset 7651.4 28272.0 593.4 1685.4 5070.8
Age 21.7 13.5 9.0 19.0 33.0
Q 1.68 0.99 1.10 1.38 1.88
Lev 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.39
Prof 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.17
BondMat 9.14 5.89 5.06 7.53 11.84
Nbond 4.97 9.72 1.00 2.00 4.00
BondPct 0.65 0.30 0.41 0.68 0.95
BondAmt 208.83 300.25 87.50 150.00 250.00
BondAmt=Asset 0.18 0.87 0.03 0.09 0.20
Cash 0.11 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.14
LimitLC 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.21
EqIssue 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01
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39Table 5. Baseline Regression
The sample includes rms with corporate bond and accounting information available in the FISD and COMPUSTAT
Annual databases for the period from 1991 to 2011. Financial and utility rms are excluded. We run the following
panel regression:
GRANi;t+1 = i + yt + Xi;t + i;t+1;
where Xi;t is a vector of explanatory variables, i is a rm or industry level xed eect, and yt is a year xed eect.
GRAN1 is the inverse of the Herndahl index of bond maturity fractions. GRAN2 is the negative of the log distance
from the perfect maturity dispersion. Size is the log of total assets. Q is the market-to-book ratio and Lev is the
market value of leverage. Age is the number of years in the COMPUSTAT le prior to observations. Prof and Tan
are protability (operating income divided by assets) and tangibility (property, plant, and equipments divided by
assets), respectively. BondMat is the average of rms' bond maturities and ProfV ol is the standard deviation of
earnings divided by assets using the past ve years. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for which standard errors
are clustered at the rm level.
GRAN1 GRAN2
Q 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.17
(4.27) (4.88) (5.29) (5.29) (4.56) (4.45) (3.52) (5.55) (3.64) (5.37) (4.17) (4.24)
Size 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.49 0.43 0.42 0.38
(24.85) (24.44) (24.78) (24.23) (11.93) (11.64) (31.61) (33.01) (29.95) (31.78) (14.62) (15.23)
Age 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.08
(8.71) (8.83) (9.08) (8.95) (0.78) (0.35) (11.82) (13.01) (11.92) (12.33) (2.01) (0.78)
Lev 1.39 1.29 1.17 1.12 1.24 1.26 0.79 1.01 0.65 0.90 1.02 1.06
(11.96) (11.03) (9.86) (9.58) (8.78) (8.81) (7.53) (11.15) (5.94) (9.66) (9.23) (10.42)
Prof -0.86 -1.03 -0.98 -1.06 -0.59 -0.57 -0.46 -0.67 -0.53 -0.74 -0.35 -0.44
(-7.10) (-8.55) (-7.65) (-8.56) (-4.64) (-4.62) (-3.65) (-6.80) (-4.10) (-7.36) (-2.97) (-4.40)
Tan 0.48 0.47 -0.12 0.34 0.33 -0.24
(4.75) (3.74) (-0.61) (5.20) (3.93) (-1.83)
BondMat 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.07
(3.15) (3.15) (0.75) (32.26) (33.01) (22.49)
ProfV ol 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05
(1.03) (1.10) (0.81) (0.75) (0.69) (0.48)
Obs: 17,179 17,125 17,179 17,125 17,179 17,125 17,396 17,342 17,396 17,342 17,396 17,342
R
2 0.369 0.378 0.386 0.391 0.654 0.655 0.488 0.632 0.502 0.640 0.786 0.831
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
40Table 6. Other Channels of Rollover Risk Management
The sample includes rms with corporate bond and accounting information available in the FISD and COMPUSTAT
Annual databases for the period from 1991 to 2011. Financial and utility rms are excluded. We run the following
panel regression:
GRANi;t+1 = i + yt + Xi;t + i;t+1;
where Xi;t is a vector of explanatory variables, i is a rm xed eect, and yt is a year xed eect. GRAN1 is
the inverse of the Herndahl index of bond maturity fractions. GRAN2 is the negative of the log distance from the
perfect maturity dispersion. Size is the log of total assets. Cash is cash holdings divided by assets. LimitLC is the
total amount of credit lines available divided by assets. Rec is the short-term debt reclassied under SFAS No. 6 as
long-term debt divided by total assets. EqIssue is sale of common and preferred stocks divided by assets. Q is the
market-to-book ratio and Lev is the market value of leverage. Age is the number of years in the COMPUSTAT le
prior to observations. Prof and Tan are protability (operating income divided by assets) and tangibility (property,
plant, and equipments divided by assets), respectively. BondMat is the average of rms' bond maturities and
ProfV ol is the standard deviation of earnings divided by assets using the past ve years. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics for which standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
GRAN1 GRAN2
Cash -0.07 0.13
(-0.54) (1.25)
Rec -2.19 -1.78
(-7.76) (-8.00)
LimitLC -0.38 -0.34
(-2.47) (-2.53)
EqIssue -0.03 0.03
(-0.25) (0.39)
Q 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.17
(4.42) (4.02) (3.94) (4.48) (4.11) (3.61) (3.77) (4.20)
Size 0.46 0.45 0.52 0.48 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.38
(11.56) (7.63) (9.52) (11.80) (15.20) (9.20) (11.88) (15.24)
Age 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.30 0.20 0.09
(0.39) (0.04) (0.21) (0.42) (0.84) (1.12) (0.90) (0.79)
Lev 1.25 1.46 1.99 1.27 1.06 1.38 1.69 1.06
(8.76) (8.36) (8.68) (8.64) (10.52) (9.54) (10.42) (10.25)
Prof -0.57 -0.55 -0.46 -0.56 -0.43 -0.43 -0.20 -0.46
(-4.65) (-2.97) (-2.53) (-4.48) (-4.28) (-2.74) (-1.37) (-4.62)
Tan -0.14 -0.59 0.09 -0.06 -0.21 -0.44 -0.04 -0.23
(-0.66) (-2.03) (0.29) (-0.29) (-1.42) (-2.26) (-0.19) (-1.67)
DebtMat 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.76) (1.96) (0.75) (0.80) (22.35) (11.53) (17.93) (22.25)
ProfV ol 0.27 -0.64 0.26 0.31 -0.01 -0.61 0.17 0.03
(0.88) (-1.67) (0.38) (1.00) (-0.02) (-1.53) (0.32) (0.11)
Obs: 17,123 6,510 10,048 16,588 17,340 6,572 10,187 16,800
R
2 0.655 0.743 0.669 0.660 0.832 0.886 0.836 0.834
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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42Table 8. Low and High Bank Loan Subsamples
The sample includes rms with corporate bond and accounting information available in the FISD and COMPUSTAT
Annual databases for the period from 1991 to 2009. Financial and utility rms are excluded. The table provides
results for the following panel regression equation:
GRANi;t+1 = i + yt + Xi;t + i;t+1
for the low and the high bank loan subsamples. Firms are categorized as low bank loan rms if corporate bonds
in FISD are more than 50% of their total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities in COMPUSTAT),
and they are categorized as high bank loan rms otherwise. Xi;t is a vector of explanatory variables, i is a rm
or industry level xed eect, and yt is a year xed eect. GRAN1 is the inverse of the Herndahl index of bond
maturity fractions. GRAN2 is the negative of the log distance from the perfect maturity dispersion. Size is the log of
total assets. Age is the number of years in the COMPUSTAT le prior to observations. Q is the market-to-book ratio
and Lev is the market value of leverage. Prof and Tan are protability (operating income divided by assets) and
tangibility (property, plant, and equipments divided by assets), respectively. BondMat is the average of rms' bond
maturities and ProfV ol is the standard deviation of earnings divided by assets using the past ve years. Numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics for which standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
GRAN1 GRAN2
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Q 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.04
(4.39) (2.49) (4.58) (1.58) (4.54) (1.97) (4.45) (0.36)
Size 0.58 0.28 0.54 0.40 0.53 0.31 0.42 0.34
(24.96) (11.25) (10.13) (3.86) (36.47) (14.11) (13.69) (4.32)
Age 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.55 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.34
(6.76) (5.32) (-0.24) (1.83) (10.20) (6.14) (-0.10) (1.27)
Lev 1.97 0.97 1.87 1.34 1.55 0.94 1.54 0.90
(12.80) (4.96) (9.19) (3.13) (14.44) (5.37) (11.41) (3.21)
Prof -1.11 -0.97 -0.32 -0.83 -0.70 -0.68 -0.22 -0.37
(-8.23) (-2.86) (-2.25) (-1.83) (-6.42) (-2.20) (-1.95) (-0.95)
Tan 0.54 -0.01 -0.01 -0.43 0.28 0.01 -0.07 -0.39
(3.82) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.94) (3.04) (0.06) (-0.46) (-1.14)
BondMat 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08
(-0.26) (3.89) (-0.89) (0.32) (27.00) (16.53) (16.10) (8.36)
ProfV ol 0.08 0.01 -0.20 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.15 0.09
(2.28) (0.93) (-0.90) (-0.07) (2.37) (-0.04) (-0.72) (1.10)
Obs: 8,355 2,651 8,355 2,651 8,439 2,667 8,439 2,667
R
2 0.524 0.326 0.763 0.634 0.737 0.627 0.899 0.850
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
43Table 9. Non-Crisis and Crisis Subsamples
The sample includes rms with corporate bond and accounting information available in the FISD and COMPUSTAT
Annual databases for the period from 1991 to 2011. Financial and utility rms are excluded. The table provides
results for the following panel regression equation:
GRANi;t+1 = i + yt + Xi;t + i;t+1
for the non-crisis (1991{2007 and 2010{2011) and the crisis (2008{2009) periods. Xi;t is a vector of explanatory
variables, i is a rm or industry level xed eect, and yt is a year xed eect. GRAN1 is the inverse of the
Herndahl index of bond maturity fractions. GRAN2 is the negative of the log distance from the perfect maturity
dispersion. Size is the log of total assets. Age is the number of years in the COMPUSTAT le prior to observations.
Q is the market-to-book ratio and Lev is market leverage. Prof and Tan are protability (operating income divided
by assets) and tangibility (property, plant, and equipments divided by assets), respectively. BondMat is the average
of rms' bond maturities and ProfV ol is the standard deviation of earnings divided by assets using the past ve
years. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for which standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
GRAN1 GRAN2
Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis
Q 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.54 0.18 0.37 0.15 0.24
(4.66) (4.50) (3.91) (3.07) (4.73) (5.10) (3.81) (2.03)
Size 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.48 0.37 0.44
(23.69) (15.81) (11.39) (1.86) (31.09) (21.19) (14.87) (2.92)
Age 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.08
(8.78) (5.69) (0.29) (3.30) (12.05) (7.88) (0.71) (2.72)
Lev 1.11 1.22 1.28 1.02 0.88 0.98 1.07 0.67
(9.40) (5.40) (8.41) (2.04) (9.50) (5.33) (9.88) (1.78)
Prof -1.02 -1.25 -0.54 -0.13 -0.72 -0.91 -0.45 -0.19
(-7.83) (-5.07) (-4.17) (-0.26) (-7.10) (-4.29) (-4.24) (-0.53)
Tan 0.48 0.36 -0.05 -0.83 0.37 -0.01 -0.20 -0.64
(3.83) (1.68) (-0.27) (-0.86) (4.32) (-0.07) (-1.46) (-1.03)
BondMat 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04
(3.20) (0.62) (0.81) (-0.13) (32.33) (17.18) (22.38) (1.88)
ProfV ol 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.63 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.59
(1.17) (1.40) (0.72) (1.19) (0.86) (0.51) (0.42) (1.34)
Obs: 15,478 1,647 15,478 1,647 15,678 1,664 15,678 1,664
R
2 0.391 0.412 0.651 0.877 0.643 0.628 0.831 0.953
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
44Table 10. Speed-Of-Adjustment Analysis
This table provides results for the following panel regression equation:
GRANi;t+1 =  
GRANi;t + (
)Xi;t + i;t+1;
where Xi;t is a vector of explanatory variables. GRAN1 is the inverse of the Herndahl index of bond maturity
fractions. GRAN2 is the negative of the log distance from the perfect maturity dispersion. Size is the log of total
assets. Age is the number of years in the COMPUSTAT le prior to observations. Q is the market-to-book ratio
and Lev is the market value of leverage. Prof and Tan are protability (operating income divided by assets) and
tangibility (property, plant, and equipments divided by assets), respectively. BondMat is the average of rms' bond
maturities and ProfV ol is the standard deviation of earnings divided by assets using the past ve years. In columns
Industry FE and Firm FE, we report the estimation results by including industry-year xed eects and rm-year xed
eects, respectively. In column Arellano-Bond, we report the estimation results employing a panel GMM estimation
using lags of maturity dispersion as instruments as in Arellano and Bond (1991). In column Han-Phillips, we provide
the results of Han and Phillips (2010) double-dierencing estimation. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for
which standard errors are clustered at the rm level. The sample period is from 1991 to 2011.
GRAN1 GRAN2
Industry FE Firm FE Arellano-Bond Han-Phillips Industry FE Firm FE Arellano-Bond Han-Phillips
GRANt 1 0.21 0.41 0.46 0.25 0.30 0.56 0.57 0.28
(24.72) (28.72) (11.01) (10.47) (23.33) (33.70) (15.02) (9.07)
Q 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.17
(7.02) (4.86) (4.65) (6.15) (6.16) (4.36) (6.81) (9.04)
Size 0.12 0.26 0.37 0.4 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.34
(16.95) (10.66) (9.64) (15.01) (18.79) (14.14) (13.93) (10.93)
Age 0.00 0.17 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.47 0.00 -0.07
(2.63) (0.49) (-3.89) (-1.90) (5.92) (1.66) (-0.76) (-2.91)
Lev 0.39 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.44 0.79 0.66 0.64
(9.55) (8.29) (6.80) (9.24) (9.96) (10.28) (8.81) (6.47)
Prof -0.29 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32 -0.28 -0.34 -0.32 -0.29
(-6.21) (-3.47) (-3.12) (-3.31) (-5.61) (-3.94) (-3.99) (-3.00)
Tan 0.08 -0.16 -0.18 -0.08 0.09 -0.21 -0.36 -0.21
(2.16) (-1.19) (-1.16) (-0.68) (2.34) (-2.07) (-3.75) (-2.87)
BondMat 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07
(7.78) (4.48) (8.15) (9.15) (20.81) (18.97) (20.05) (18.44)
ProfV ol 0.00 -0.03 -0.18 -0.24 0.00 0.04 -0.18 -0.22
(0.52) (-0.31) (-1.73) (-0.77) (0.10) (0.37) (-1.31) (-1.09)
Obs: 15,282 15,282 12,426 14,740 15,576 15,576 12,516 14,882
R
2 0.114 0.136 0.228 0.399
45Table 11. Bond Issuance Regressions
Linear probability models are estimated for each maturity bucket (j = 1;2;:::;7):
Prob(I
j
it) = a1m
1
it + a2m
2
it + a3m
3
i + a4m
4
i + a5m
5
i + a6m
6
i + a7m
7
i;
where j is ve two-year maturity buckets dened as 2j   1 to 2j years for maturities shorter than 10 years (j  5),
and two maturity buckets (11 to 20 years and 11 years or longer) for maturities longer than 10 (j = 6 or j = 7). The
variable m
j
i is obtained by subtracting a benchmark from each rm's maturity prole where the maturity prole is
dened as fractions of pre-existing bond amounts in each maturity bucket j. After rms are sorted into 64 (=2
6)
groups based on six variables (market-to-book, market leverage, age, size, protability, and average maturity), the
benchmark is obtained by averaging maturity proles in each group. Issuance dummy I
j
it is one if the bond i's
maturity falls in bucket j, and is zero if the bond has a dierent maturity than bucket j. We include Fama-French 49
industry xed eects for the issuing rm i and year xed eects. Panel A1 is for a sample with bond issues greater
than 3% of rms' pre-existing bonds, and Panel A2 is for bond issues greater than 10%. Panel B1 and B2 exclude all
bonds with option features (callability, convertibility, putability and sinking fund provisions) from the sample. The
hypothesis test (H0: ai 
1
6
P
n6=i an = 0) is also reported. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics for which standard
errors are clustered at the industry level. The sample period is from 1991 to 2011.
Panel A1: Issue Cuto at 3%, All Bonds
1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr 21- Yr
m1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.29 -0.07 -0.05 0.09 0.17
(-1.42) (-1.96) (-4.30) (-1.01) (-0.64) (1.07) (2.37)
m2 0.05 -0.09 -0.28 -0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.18
(3.03) (-3.19) (-6.85) (-1.30) (-1.12) (2.98) (4.16)
m3 -0.02 -0.01 -0.36 -0.03 -0.05 0.12 0.06
(-1.40) (-0.42) (-9.99) (-0.88) (-1.22) (2.55) (1.68)
m4 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.17 -0.06 0.06 -0.01
(0.93) (0.17) (-2.48) (-4.82) (-1.71) (1.28) (-0.29)
m5 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.18 0.15 -0.06
(-0.12) (1.16) (0.66) (-3.60) (-5.21) (3.58) (-1.75)
m6 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.14 -0.12 -0.20
(0.46) (1.96) (1.10) (0.62) (-3.62) (-2.70) (-5.18)
m7 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.08 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27
(3.87) (3.38) (3.67) (1.76) (-5.74) (-4.82) (-6.11)
Obs: 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985 6,985
H0 -0.05 -0.09 -0.30 -0.15 -0.09 -0.17 -0.29
(-2.25) (-3.43) (-7.87) (-3.91) (-2.54) (-3.51) (-6.18)
Panel A2: Issue Cuto at 10%, All Bonds
1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr 21- Yr
m1 -0.07 -0.20 -0.39 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.12
(-2.79) (-4.75) (-5.14) (0.21) (0.30) (2.37) (1.57)
m2 -0.01 -0.14 -0.31 -0.04 -0.03 0.18 0.17
(-0.90) (-5.78) (-6.98) (-0.94) (-0.62) (3.18) (3.89)
m3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.37 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.05
(-1.85) (-0.94) (-9.78) (-0.29) (-0.33) (2.41) (1.32)
m4 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.16 -0.07 0.05 -0.01
(0.24) (-0.45) (-2.64) (-4.08) (-1.65) (0.99) (-0.15)
m5 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.19 0.17 -0.04
(-0.46) (0.84) (-0.08) (-3.29) (-5.15) (3.86) (-1.18)
m6 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.08 -0.09 -0.23 -0.28
(1.29) (1.60) (3.35) (1.86) (-1.99) (-4.46) (-7.20)
m7 0.07 0.11 0.26 0.19 -0.20 -0.36 -0.60
(4.70) (4.15) (5.32) (3.59) (-3.65) (-5.92) (-12.63)
Obs: 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755
H0 -0.08 -0.13 -0.31 -0.17 -0.14 -0.28 -0.60
(-3.06) (-5.16) (-7.83) (-4.22) (-3.48) (-5.26) (-11.92)
46Panel B1: Issue Cuto at 3%, Straight Bonds Only
1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr 21- Yr
m1 -0.09 -0.10 -0.37 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.13
(-1.32) (-1.04) (-2.96) (-0.18) (-0.05) (0.17) (1.12)
m2 0.11 -0.12 -0.34 0.05 -0.09 0.20 0.11
(2.61) (-1.88) (-4.45) (0.77) (-1.40) (2.44) (1.59)
m3 -0.04 -0.03 -0.45 -0.01 0.02 0.18 0.07
(-1.18) (-0.46) (-6.51) (-0.14) (0.35) (2.48) (1.11)
m4 0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.05 0.06 -0.16
(1.43) (0.86) (-0.69) (-2.47) (-0.82) (0.85) (-2.58)
m5 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.17 0.17 -0.12
(-0.72) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.47) (-3.21) (2.57) (-2.00)
m6 0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 0.12 -0.10
(0.30) (0.92) (-1.51) (-1.70) (-3.28) (1.85) (-1.77)
m7 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21
(1.83) (0.97) (0.12) (-0.09) (-3.08) (-2.57) (-3.21)
Obs: 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525
H0 -0.11 -0.12 -0.33 -0.13 -0.10 0.06 -0.21
(-1.66) (-1.82) (-4.54) (-2.11) (-1.86) (0.46) (-2.96)
Panel B2: Issue Cuto at 10%, Straight Bonds Only
1-2 Yr 3-4 Yr 5-6 Yr 7-8 Yr 9-10 Yr 11-20 Yr 21- Yr
m1 -0.14 -0.28 -0.38 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.20
(-2.06) (-2.63) (-2.50) (1.33) (0.06) (0.59) (1.50)
m2 0.00 -0.16 -0.37 0.12 -0.04 0.23 0.12
(-0.03) (-2.52) (-4.18) (1.42) (-0.50) (2.53) (1.56)
m3 -0.04 -0.06 -0.47 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.11
(-1.09) (-0.96) (-5.83) (0.00) (0.76) (1.81) (1.57)
m4 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 -0.14
(1.31) (-0.16) (-0.47) (-1.67) (-0.57) (0.45) (-2.05)
m5 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 0.21 -0.11
(-0.96) (-0.53) (-0.11) (-0.15) (-3.06) (2.90) (-1.67)
m6 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.14 0.02 -0.23
(0.81) (0.52) (0.88) (-0.68) (-2.11) (0.26) (-3.40)
m7 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.02 -0.18 -0.23 -0.34
(2.22) (1.24) (1.88) (0.21) (-2.28) (-2.63) (-4.33)
Obs: 1,822 1,822 1,822 1,822 1,822 1,822 1,822
H0 -0.15 -0.12 -0.39 -0.16 -0.15 -0.05 -0.33
(-2.31) (-1.83) (-4.56) (-2.06) (-2.23) (-0.59) (-4.07)
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